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RELYING ON ATKINS V. VIRGINIA AS PRECEDENT
TO FIND THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: PERPETUATING BAD
PRECEDENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 2002, the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia,' thereby
declaring the imposition of death sentences on mentally retarded defendants to
be violative of the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual
punishment."2 Atkins marked the reversal of Penry v. Lynaugh,3 decided in
1989, which held that the Eighth Amendment does not categorically preclude
the execution of mentally retarded defendants, so long as juries are permitted
to both "consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of mental retardation
in imposing sentence." 4 The Atkins decision, which drew extensively upon
the 1988 case of Thompson v. Oklahoma5 where the Court found
unconstitutional the death sentence of an individual who had committed
murder at the age of fifteen, has led many to wonder if the Supreme Court,
and perhaps even the American populace, is growing increasingly
disenchanted with capital punishment.
6
Although the Atkins court stated that the sort of national consensus that it
discerned against the execution of mentally retarded individuals has
apparently not yet developed with respect to juvenile offenders,7 there is,
nonetheless, reason to believe that the Court will soon revisit the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, especially in light of the
publicity that has recently surrounded the practice. On January 21, 2003, Lee
Malvo, the seventeen-year-old Washington-area sniper suspect, was indicted
by a Virginia grand jury for capital murder.8 Because Virginia does not
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
4. Id. at 340.
5. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
6. See, e.g., The Ebbing of Death, THE ECONOMIST, June 29, 2002, at 47 (suggesting that
"America's long love affair with death [may] be cooling.").
7. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 n.18 (2002).
8. Jayson Blair, Virginia Indicts Young Sniper Suspect on Murder Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 2003, at AI2.
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specify a minimum age in its capital punishment statute,9 Malvo faced the
death penalty. On December 18, 2003, a Virginia jury convicted Malvo of
"capital murder, terrorism, and weapons charges."' 10 Although the jury
ultimately spared Malvo's life, it was deadlocked over the decision for nine
hours over the course of two days, and at least five of the twelve jurors
favored a death sentence."
At least four Supreme Court Justices favor the abolition of the juvenile
death penalty, as evidenced by the vigorous dissent, written by Justice Stevens
and joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, from the Court's recent
denial of Kevin Stanford's petition for habeas corpus relief.12 Stanford was
seventeen years old when he committed capital murder. 13  The dissenters
asserted that the very same reasons that led the Court in Atkins to declare the
execution of mentally retarded persons unconstitutional "apply with equal or
greater force to the execution of juvenile offenders."' 14  The argument
espoused by the dissenters, as well as by death penalty abolitionists, 15 is that
imposing capital punishment on juvenile defendants is particularly egregious,
due, in part, to what they perceive to be the reduced culpability of individuals
under the age of eighteen. 16 Because adolescents are generally believed to
lack the cognitive maturity of adults, they are less able to engage in reasoned
value judgment, they are more susceptible to peer pressure, and they are more
likely to engage in risk-taking. 17  For these reasons, the dissenters argue,
juveniles do not possess the capacity to be held fully responsible for their
9. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie 2002).
10. Jury Spares Malvo 's life in Washington sniper case, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/23/sprj.dcsp.malvo.trial (Dec. 25, 2003).
11. Jury Sharply Split in Sparing Sniper Malvo, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/24/sprj.dcsp.malvo.trial/index.html (Dec. 24, 2003).
12. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thirteen years earlier, in
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), the Court affirmed Kevin Stanford's death sentence,
finding the imposition of capital punishment on offenders who committed their crimes at ages sixteen
or seventeen not to be per se unconstitutional.
13. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365.
14. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15. See, e.g., Richard J. Brody, Don't Kill Children, 72 A.B.A. J., June 1, 1986, at 32 (arguing
that juveniles are not wholly responsible for their crimes and, thus, should not be subjected to capital
punishment).
16. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. See id at 970-71; see also Helene B. Greenwald, Capital Punishment for Minors: An
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1471, 1492-98 (1993) (discussing the
various reasons that juveniles are less responsible, and therefore, less morally blameworthy than
adults. Greenwald points to an adolescent's developmental stage to buttress her argument that
adolescents have a tendency to be more impulsive and less mature than adults, and they are also more
likely to rebel against authority and to be influenced by the desire to fit in with their peers).
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actions.18 They further assert that over the course of the last thirteen years,' 9 a
national consensus has developed opposing the imposition of capital
punishment on anyone under the age of eighteen.20 Although not mentioned
by the dissenters, the widespread international disapproval of the juvenile
death penalty21 is often relied upon by death penalty abolitionists in support of
their contention that the practice is repugnant and has become a human rights
pariah.22 Thus, in light of the spirited Stanford dissent, one is left to ponder
whether a Court that has just recently embraced the categorical exclusion of
the mentally retarded from the death penalty may soon reconsider, and
perhaps reverse, Stanford v. Kentucky,23 in which it refused to exempt sixteen
and seventeen-year-old offenders from capital punishment.
The thesis of this Comment is simply that there is no justifiable basis on
which to categorically exclude sixteen and seventeen-year-old murderers from
the death penalty. Although there is a viable argument that some of the very
same reasons on which the Court relied to exempt mentally retarded
individuals from capital punishment also applies to adolescents, this Comment
will contend that the rationale the Court has employed to carve out exceptions
for mentally retarded persons and juveniles under the age of sixteen is simply
18. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. Thirteen years earlier, the Court decided Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), in
which it upheld the death sentences of two defendants who had committed their capital crimes at the
ages of sixteen and seventeen. The Stanford Court's analysis was heavily based upon the lack of a
discernable national consensus opposing the imposition of capital punishment on sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds.
20. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 971-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. See generally David Heffeman, America the Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis of the
Eighth Amendment Under International Law, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 481 (1996) (discussing the
juvenile death penalty in the United States in light of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which the United States ratified in 1992. The author concludes that Eighth
Amendment juvenile death penalty jurisprudence is out of sync with the international standard); see
also Catherine E. Hull, "Enlightened By a Humane Justice": An International Law Argument
Against the Juvenile Death Penalty, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 1079 (1999) (asserting that by continuing to
sanction juvenile executions, the United States is violating both international law and its treaties);
Richard C. Dieter, International Perspectives on the Death Penalty: A Costly Isolation for the U.S.,
(1999), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/internationalreport.html (discussing the international
trend toward the abolition of the death penalty, and the harmful effects of the increasing international
criticism of the United States for directly contravening international custom and treaties by
continuing to impose death sentences, especially on juveniles) (last visited on Feb. 23, 2003).
22. Since 1990, juvenile executions have been documented in only six countries besides the
United States-Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. See Juveniles and the Death Penalty, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited on
Feb. 23, 2003). Since 2000, Texas is the only jurisdiction in the world that has been known to
execute juveniles. Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and
Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973 - December 31, 2002, at
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib.
23. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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unpersuasive and fails to justify a constitutional restriction on a state's ability
to execute the murderers within its borders. Part II of this Comment will
begin with an explanation of the Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia,24 in
which it found the execution of mentally retarded persons to be "cruel and
unusual." Part III will begin with a brief history of the juvenile death penalty,
followed by a summary of the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions
in Thompson v. Oklahoma,25 where the Court determined that the imposition
of the death penalty on anyone under the age of sixteen violates the Eighth
Amendment. Part III then discusses the Stanford26 decision, which upheld the
rights of states to execute juveniles between the ages of sixteen and eighteen.
Next, Part IV highlights the similarities between the Court's rationale in
Atkins and in Thompson, and contends that the rationale in these two cases is
not only convoluted, but would also be a poor basis on which to build an
argument that all juveniles should be exempted from the death penalty.
Finally, Part V demonstrates that there is simply no justification for
categorically exempting juveniles from the death penalty because the sort of
individualized consideration that is constitutionally mandated in capital cases
sufficiently ensures that only the most deserving offenders, regardless of their
age, are executed.
II. ATKINS v. VIRGINIA
A. The Facts and the Lower Court Holding
On the night of August 16, 1996, Daryl Renard Atkins and an accomplice,
William Jones, after a day spent drinking and smoking marijuana,27 robbed a
convenience store with a semi-automatic handgun.28  After driving their
victim, Eric Nesbitt, to an automated teller machine and forcing him to
withdraw $200, Atkins and his partner then drove to a deserted area where,
according to the co-conspirator's testimony, which the jury accepted, Atkins
shot Nesbitt eight times at close range in the thorax, chest, abdomen, arms,
and legs. 9
Atkins was charged with abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder.30
At the guilt phase of Atkins's trial, Jones and Atkins essentially told the same
24. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
25. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
26. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
27. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 307.
29. Id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 307.
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story with one paramount variation-each claimed that the other had shot
Nesbitt. 31 The jury credited Jones's testimony and found Atkins guilty of the
murder. The State relied on Atkins's prior felony convictions, sixteen of
them to be exact; 33 the testimony of his past victims; 34 the photographs of
Nesbitt's dead body; and the autopsy report to prove both "future
dangerousness" and "vileness of the offense" as aggravating circumstances at
sentencing. 35 The defense then introduced the testimony of a psychologist
who asserted that Atkins's IQ of fifty-nine qualified him as "mildly mentally
retarded., 3 6 Although Atkins's mental retardation became a "central issue
' 37
at the penalty phase, the jury nonetheless sentenced him to death.38
Atkins argued unsuccessfully to the Virginia Supreme Court that "he
[was] mentally retarded and thus, [could not] be sentenced to death. 39
Relying on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Penry v. Lynaugh
40
that mental retardation alone is insufficient to preclude the imposition of the
death penalty, a majority of the Virginia court dismissed his contention,
stating that it was "'not willing to commute Atkins' sentence of death to life
imprisonment merely because of his IQ score.' A 1
B. The Majority's Analysis and Holding
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to revisit Penry and to
determine whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty on mentally retarded offenders. 42  The majority43 began its
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia notes that Atkins's prior felony convictions
included robbery, abduction, use of a firearm, and maiming).
34. See id. (Justice Scalia points out that Atkins's victims characterized him as having violent
tendencies. "He slapped a gun across [one] victim's face, clubbed her in the head with it, knocked
her to the ground, and then helped her up, only to shoot her in the stomach.").
35. Id. at 308.
36. Id. at 309.
37. Id. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 309. Because the trial court had used a "misleading verdict form," the Virginia
Supreme Court ordered another sentencing hearing at which Atkins was again sentenced to death. Id.
39. Id. at 310 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 534 S.E.2d 312, 318 (Va. 2000)).
40. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally
retarded individual is not categorically precluded by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment so long as the jury is able to consider evidence of the individual's mental
retardation at sentencing).
41. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (Va. 2000)).
42. Id.
43. The majority opinion was written by Justice Stevens who was joined by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
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analysis with a review of the Eighth Amendment standard, emphasizing that a
punishment is deemed cruel and unusual not by the standards of times past,
but rather by those "'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.' 44  According to the majority, the best indicator of
currently prevailing values is found in legislative enactments.45
Prior to 1986, in those states that sanctioned capital punishment, there was
no exclusion for the mentally retarded.46 However, in response to public
disapproval of the execution of a mentally retarded offender in 1986, Georgia
became the first state to ban such executions.47 Congress followed Georgia's
lead in 1988 when it reinstated the federal death penalty, but expressly
exempted mentally retarded individuals.48 In 1989, Maryland enacted similar
legislation.49 Yet in its decision that year in Penry, the Supreme Court found
that the two state enactments were insufficient to establish any sort of national
consensus. 50 Since 1989, however, the Court pointed out that sixteen states
have adopted legislation banning the execution of the mentally retarded. 51
According to the majority, "[i]t is not so much the number of these States that
is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change., 52 Not only have
eighteen of the thirty-eight states that sanction capital punishment 53 explicitly
exempted mentally retarded individuals, but since 1989, only five states that
allow for such executions have in fact put mentally retarded offenders to
death. 4 Therefore, according to the majority, "[t]he practice ... has become
truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed
against it."
5 5
44. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
45. Id. at 312. The "'clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is
the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures."' Id. (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331).
46. Id. at 313.
47. Id.; see GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310) (Supp. 1988).
48. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314. As currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c), the Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994 states that "a sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is
mentally retarded." 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c).
49. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314; see also MD. CODE ANN., Art. 27, § 412(0(1) (1989) (repealed
2002) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002)).
50. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
51. Atkins, 536 U.S at 314. Since 1990, Kentucky, Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas,
Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut,
Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina have all exempted the mentally retarded from the death
penalty. Id.
52. Id. at 315.
53. Id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 316 n.20. The states that have executed mentally retarded offenders since 1989 are
Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id.
55. Id. at 316.
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In support of its finding of a national consensus against the execution of
the mentally retarded, the majority cited a variety of social and professional
organizations, as well as poll results, seeming to indicate additional evidence
of a consistent American consensus.56 Further, the majority pointed out that
the practice of executing mentally retarded persons is "overwhelmingly
disapproved" by most of the world.57
The majority concluded its analysis with an assertion that the purposes
which capital punishment is meant to serve, namely retribution and
deterrence, are not furthered by imposing the death penalty on mentally
retarded individuals.58  The majority dismissed the retributive function,
claiming that mentally retarded individuals simply are not as culpable as
persons of normal intelligence and thus should not be put to death.5 9 With
respect to deterrence, the Court explained that due to their diminished mental
capacity, mentally retarded individuals are not capable of engaging in the sort
of cost-benefit analysis that normally deters individuals from committing
heinous crimes.60  Finally, the majority asserted that not only are mentally
retarded persons less able to contribute to their defenses than defendants of
normal intelligence, they also appear less remorseful to juries, and they are
more apt to make false confessions. 61 Thus, the Court concluded that the
execution of mentally retarded individuals is categorically violative of the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.62
C. The Atkins Dissent
63
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized that a punishment
may be deemed cruel and unusual only if it contravenes either the standard
employed at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights or the "'evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." '64  In
56. Id. at 316 n.21.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 319-20.
59. Id. at 320.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 321.
63. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia wrote dissents, and both were joined by
Justice Thomas. Rehnquist, while agreeing with Scalia, wrote separately only to "call attention to the
defects in the Court's decision to place weight on foreign laws, the views of professional and
religious organizations, and opinion polls in reaching its conclusion." Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Because Scalia also addresses this topic, this section will focus only on his more
comprehensive dissent.
64. Id. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1985)).
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1791, only severely mentally retarded individuals known as "idiots ' 65 were
exempt from the death penalty, and therefore, the execution of mildly or even
moderately retarded individuals, like Atkins, would not have been considered
cruel and unusual at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.66 Thus, the
imposition of the death penalty on the mildly mentally retarded could be
found cruel and unusual only if it violated contemporary standards of
decency, "as evinced by objective indicia, the most important of which is
'legislation enacted by the country's legislatures. ,,67
Justice Scalia went on to criticize the majority for discerning a national
consensus when eighteen states-amounting to only forty-seven percent of
the thirty-eight states which sanction capital punishment-had recently
enacted legislation forbidding the execution of mentally retarded
individuals. 68 The fact that less than half of death penalty states chose to
categorically prohibit the execution of mentally retarded individuals hardly
constituted the sort of consensus that could justify an Eighth Amendment ban
on all such executions, especially because earlier cases had required a
considerably higher degree of uniformity among the states before a
punishment was deemed cruel and unusual. 69 Further, only eleven of those
eighteen states had enacted "statutes prohibiting execution of mentally
retarded defendants convicted after, or convicted of crimes committed after,
the effective date of the legislation., 70 Therefore, those already sentenced to
65. Id. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cites a variety of sources which identify
"idiots" as having an IQ in the range of twenty-five. Id. Due to their profound mental incompetence,
these individuals were deemed incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, and thus, they were not
held responsible for their actions. Id.
66. Id. at 340-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989)).
68. Id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia points, inter alia, to both Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977), where the Court found the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant
convicted of rape to be cruel and unusual when Georgia was the only jurisdiction that permitted such
a sentence, and to Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982), where the Court found the death
sentence of a defendant whose accomplice in a robbery committed murder to be cruel and unusual
because such a punishment was prohibited in seventy-eight percent of all death penalty states as
examples of the level of agreement among the states that had previously been found to be indicative
of a national consensus. Id.
70. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 (emphasis in original); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 n. 1 (citing
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(I) (Supp. 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(d)(1) (1997);
Reams v. State, 909 S.W.2d 324, 326-27 (Ark. 1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.137(8) (Supp. 2002); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310) (1997); IND. CODE § 35-36-9-6 (1998); Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506,
512 (Ind. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(d), 21-4631(c) (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
532.140(3) (1999); MD. CODE ANN., Art. 27, § 412(g) (1996); Booth v. State, 608 A.2d 162 (Md.
1992); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030(7) (Supp. 2001); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27.12(c)
(McKinney Supp. 2002); 1995 N.Y. LAW. ch. 1, § 38; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(b) (1997);
Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 798-99 (Tenn. 2001)).
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death, as well as those sentenced prior to the effective date of the statute,
could still be executed. 71  According to Justice Scalia, this indicated not "a
statement of absolute moral repugnance, but one of current preference
between two tolerable approaches. 72
Moreover, Justice Scalia pointed out that the legislation on which the
majority's opinion hinges had existed in none of the eighteen states for more
than fourteen years, and in fact over half of the statutes were only eight years
old.73 According to Justice Scalia, basing constitutional doctrine "'upon the
narrow experience of [a few] years' ' 74 is "'myopic,' ' 75 as it is yet unclear to
most, if not all, of the states whether this legislation will prove to be prudent
in the years to come.76 He also criticized the majority's assertion that "[i]t is
not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency
of the direction of change" 77 as being extremely poor evidence of a national
consensus given that just fourteen years ago, the imposition of the death
penalty on the mentally retarded was not prohibited in any death penalty state,
and thus, there was no other direction in which change could go.
78
Justice Scalia found further fault with the majority's contention that the
fact that mentally retarded persons are so infrequently executed is evidence of
a consensus against the practice. 79 He pointed out that even if it were certain
that mentally retarded persons are rarely executed, which it was not,80 this
would not be surprising, as they account for only about one to three percent of
the population. 81 The alleged infrequency of these executions could also be a
result of the constitutional mandate that mental retardation be considered as a
mitigating factor at sentencing.82 Moreover, as was stated in Stanford v.
Kentucky83 with regard to juvenile offenders, "'it is not only possible, but
71. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 343 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 614 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original)).
75. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
76. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
77. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 344-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia pointed to various sources which suggest that a
significant number of death row inmates are mentally retarded. Id.; see, e.g., Raymond Bonner and
Sara Rimer, Executing the Mentally Retarded Even as Laws Begin to Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2000, at Al (stating that mentally retarded individuals account for ten percent of the death row
population). Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989)).
83. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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overwhelmingly probable, that the very considerations which induce [today's
majority] to believe that death should never be imposed on [mentally
retarded] offenders ... cause prosecutors and juries to believe that it should
rarely be imposed."
84
Next, Scalia lambasted the majority for its displaced reliance on the views
of religious and professional organizations, the laws of other nations, and
public opinion polls. He agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist who pointed out
in his dissent that the views of religious and professional organizations are not
only irrelevant, but are also inappropriate foundations on which to base
constitutional doctrine, as federalism demands that any constraint upon
"'democratic government must [be apparent] in the operative acts (laws and
the application of laws) that the people have approved."' 8 5 Further, Justice
Scalia asserted that because only Americans must abide by the demands of the
Constitution, the laws of other nations, regardless of how "'enlightened the
Justices of [the] Court may think them to be' '8 6 have no application when no
discernable American consensus exists.8 7 Public opinion polls are the most
clearly irrelevant basis on which to build constitutional doctrine, for as
pointed out by Chief Justice Rehnquist, their empirical validity is suspect at
best. s8
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by criticizing the majority's
contention that the execution of mentally retarded individuals fails to further
the two social purposes of capital punishment schemes: retribution and
deterrence. 89  After noting that the majority completely disregarded
incapacitation as another legitimate social purpose, 90 Justice Scalia argued
that "culpability, and deservedness of the most severe retribution, depends not
merely (if at all) upon the mental capacity of the criminal (above the level
where he is able to distinguish right from wrong) but also upon the depravity
of the crime."9' He contended that a mentally retarded person who carries out
84. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
374 (1989) (alterations added by Justice Scalia)).
85. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377
(1989) (alterations in original)).
86. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69
n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
87. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
88. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
89. Idat 350-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976)
(wherein Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens noted that "incapacitation of dangerous criminals and
the consequent prevention of crimes that they may otherwise commit in the future" is a third social
goal of the death penalty)).
91. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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"an exquisite torture-killing" 92 is surely more culpable than the "average"
murderer in a domestic dispute,93 for instance, whom the Court has in
previous cases deemed to lack the degree of moral blameworthiness sufficient
to justify the death penalty.94 Therefore, Justice Scalia contended that so long
as a mentally retarded person is capable of distinguishing right from wrong, it
should be left up to the sentencer's discretion to determine whether his mental
retardation constitutes a mitigating circumstance sufficient to exempt him
from the death penalty. 95
Moreover, the majority's assertion that mentally retarded individuals are
less deterred by the possibility of death does not warrant a conclusion that no
mentally retarded person will be deterred.96 Justice Scalia argues that the
"deterrent effect of a penalty is adequately vindicated if it successfully deters
many, but not all, of the target class, ' ' 9 7 and thus, unless it can be
demonstrated that every mentally retarded person is both incapable of
understanding the threat of death, as well as unable to conform his conduct to
"the law in such a rudimentary matter as murder,"98 the social goal of
deterrence is furthered.
III. JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE
A. A Brief History of the Juvenile Death Penalty
At the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment in 1791,99
underlying the juvenile death penalty was the notion of criminal liability
found in the English common law 00 and articulated in Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England 01 According to Blackstone, there
was an irrebuttable presumption that children under age seven were unable to
form criminal intent, and thus, they were absolutely protected from the death
92. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality
opinion)).
95. Id at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Warren M. Kato, The Juvenile Death Penalty, 18 J. JUV. L. 112, 113 (1997).
100. Greenwald, supra note 17, at 1473.
101. Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of the Child?, 26
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 147, 150 (1995); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 864 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England were "widely
accepted at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted as an accurate description of the common
law").
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penalty. 10 2 Children between the ages of seven and fourteen benefited from a
rebuttable presumption of incapacity to harbor criminal intent; 10 3 however, if
it could be shown that the child both understood the wrongful nature of his or
her act and was capable of distinguishing right from wrong, the presumption
could be overcome, and the death penalty could be imposed. 10 4 Beyond the
age of fourteen, children were deemed capable of forming the requisite
criminal intent so as to be held fully liable for their crimes. 1
05
The first known execution of a juvenile in the United States occurred in
1642 when sixteen-year-old Thomas Graunger' 0 6 was hung for committing
bestiality in Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts. 10 7 A ten-year-old Cherokee,
James Arcene, became the youngest person ever executed when he was
hanged for robbery and murder in Arkansas in 1885.108 Since 1642,
approximately 365 juvenile offenders have been executed by thirty-eight
states and the federal government. 10 9 As of April 1, 2003, there were eighty-
two inmates on death row who were sentenced as juveniles. 10
B. Thompson v. Oklahoma'"
The Supreme Court was first presented with the issue of the juvenile death
penalty in Bell v. Ohio, 1 2 and again in Eddings v. Oklahoma,1 3 but in both
102. Kato, supra note 99, at 113; see also Greenwald, supra note 17, at 1473.
103. Kato, supra note 99, at 113.
104. Greenwald, supra note 17, at 1473.
105. Id. see also Strater, supra note 101, at 150 (noting that "[t]he law presumed that children
fourteen or older had the same criminal capacity as adults").
106. Streib, supra note 22, at 3.
107. James E. Harrison, The Juvenile Death Penalty in Florida: Should Sixteen-Year-Old
Offenders be Subject to Capital Punishment?, 1 BARRY L. REV. 159, 163 (2000).
108. Strater, supra note 101, at 151.
109. Streib, supra note 22, at 3. Currently, thirty-eight states and the federal government (both
civilian and military) authorize capital punishment. Id at 6-7. Eighteen of those jurisdictions have
explicitly set the minimum age for execution at age eighteen. (California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland. Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, federal government-both civilian and military). Id Five
states have opted for a minimum age of seventeen-Florida, Georgia, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Texas. Id. The remaining seventeen states have permitted the execution of sixteen-year-
olds, due either to an express statutory provision or to the Supreme Court's ruling in Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). Id. The states that statutorily have chosen age sixteen are
Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, Virginia, and Wyoming. The states that are required by
Thompson to set the minimum age at sixteen are Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah. Id.
110. NAACP LDF "Death Row USA," Apr. 1, 2003, available at www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
(last visited on Feb. 23, 2003).
111. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
112. 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
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cases, it avoided the issue by deciding on other grounds. 14 Not until 1988, in
Thompson v. Oklahoma,115 did the Court squarely address the constitutionality
of the juvenile death penalty."16
Thompson was fifteen years old when he was convicted and sentenced to
death for participating in the brutal murder of his former brother-in-law.
1 7
The Court granted certiorari to determine whether the imposition of the death
penalty on a fifteen-year-old constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" in
violation of the Eighth Amendment." 18
1. The Plurality
The plurality-Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun-
concluded that the imposition of the death penalty on any individual under the
age of sixteen is always unconstitutional. "9 They began their analysis by
pointing out that the drafters of the Eighth Amendment never defined what
constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment," but instead left that task to
judges, who are to be guided by "'the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."",120 To discern contemporary values and
standards of decency, the Court has in the past considered not only "the work
product of state legislatures and sentencing juries,"' 21 but also "the reasons
why a civilized society may accept or reject the death penalty in certain types
113. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
114. In Bell, the Court considered the case of a defendant who was sixteen years old when he
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Bell, 438 U.S. at 104. The Court reversed the
death sentence and remanded the case because the Ohio death penalty statute failed to permit the
individualized consideration of mitigating factors as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and as stated in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). Bell, 438 U.S. at 642. In
Lockett, the Court determined that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer
be permitted to consider any mitigating factor before imposing the death penalty. Lockett, 438 U.S.
at 604. In Eddings, the Court granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of the juvenile death
penalty, but again sidestepped the issue. Again relying on Lockett, it reversed Eddings's death
sentence because the lower court failed to individually consider all of the mitigating factors in direct
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14. See Kato, supra
note 99, at 114 (discussing the Eddings decision).
115. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
116. Id.
117. Id. at819.
118. Id. at 820.
119. Id. at 823 (plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 821 (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
121. Id. at 822 (plurality opinion). The plurality notes that "[olur capital punishment
jurisprudence has consistently recognized that contemporary standards, as reflected by the actions of
legislatures and juries, provide an important measure of whether the death penalty is 'cruel and
unusual."' Id. at 822 n.7.
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of cases.' 22
The plurality reviewed the actions of state legislatures, noting the degree
of uniformity among the states in the manner in which they treat juveniles
under age sixteen with respect to a variety of activities.
123  No state 124
permitted fifteen-year-olds to vote or to serve on juries. 12 5  Only one state
authorized a fifteen-year-old to drive without parental consent, and all but
four states mandated that a fifteen-year-old obtain parental consent before
marrying. 126 Furthermore, in every state, by legislative fiat, the maximum age
for juvenile court jurisdiction was designated at no less than sixteen.127 The
plurality concluded that this sort of legislation was "consistent with the
experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law, that the normal
15-year-old is not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult."'
128
Next, the plurality examined the most relevant legislative enactments-
those that related to the age requirements of the various state death penalty
statutes. 29  In fourteen states, capital punishment was forbidden under any
circumstances.130 Of the thirty-seven jurisdictions' 3 1 that authorized the death
penalty, nineteen did not explicitly specify a minimum age.132 The remaining
eighteen states expressly prohibited the execution of anyone under the age of
sixteen. 133
The plurality acknowledged the potential argument that perhaps the
nineteen states that had not expressly set a minimum age did so intentionally
122. Id. (plurality opinion).
123. Id. at 823-29 (plurality opinion). The plurality stated that "[t]here is, however, complete
or near unanimity among all 50 States and the District of Columbia in treating a person under 16 as a
minor for several important purposes." Id. at 824 (plurality opinion).
124. Hereinafter, the District of Columbia is included within the term "states."
125. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824 (plurality opinion).
126. Id. (plurality opinion).
127. Id. (plurality opinion).
128. Id. at 824-25 (plurality opinion).
129. ld. at 826-29 (plurality opinion).
130. Id. at 826 n.25 (plurality opinion). Those states were Alaska, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. (plurality opinion).
131. The federal government is included within this number. Herein, for simplicity's sake, the
federal government will be included within the term "states" unless otherwise noted.
132. Id. at 826-27 (plurality opinion). Those states were Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 828 n.26
(plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 829 (plurality opinion). Those states were California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas. Id. at 829-30 n.30 (plurality
opinion).
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in the belief that there was no age at which the imposition of the death penalty
would have been cruel and unusual. 134  However, the plurality readily
dismissed this argument, stating that "[w]e think it self-evident that such an
argument is unacceptable.' 35 Thus, the remainder of the plurality's analysis
was premised on the assumption that a minimum age line had to be drawn-
the only question remaining was at what age to draw it. And so, the plurality
"confine[d] [its] attention to the 18 States that [had] expressly established a
minimum age in their death penalty statutes,"'136 and disregarded the other
nineteen states that had not done so. On this basis, the plurality concluded
that "it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person who
was less than sixteen years old at the time of his or her offense.' 37  The
plurality also noted that its conclusion was consistent with the views of other
Western nations,138 as well as with those of the American Bar Association and
the American Law Institute.1
39
Next, the plurality examined the behavior of American juries, 140 pointing
out that the last execution of an offender under the age of sixteen occurred in
1948 when Irvin Mattio, who was fifteen at the time of his crime, was
executed in Louisiana. 141 According to statistics compiled by the Department
of Justice, between the years 1982 and 1986, of the 1393 persons who were
sentenced to death, only five of them were under the age of sixteen when they
committed their offense.' 42 While the plurality admitted that these statistics
are susceptible to a variety of different interpretations, they nonetheless
"suggest[ed] that these five young offenders [had] received sentences that
[were] 'cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual."",
143
Finally, the plurality considered whether the imposition of the death
penalty on offenders under the age of sixteen "'measurably contribute [d] "44 to
the social purposes that are served by the death penalty,"'145 namely retribution
134. Id. at 827-28 (plurality opinion).
135. Id. at 828 (plurality opinion).
136. Id. at 829 (plurality opinion).
137. Id. at 830 (plurality opinion).
138. Id. at 830-31 (plurality opinion).
139. Id. at 830 (plurality opinion).
140. Id. at 831-33 (plurality opinion).
141. Id. at 832 (plurality opinion) (citing VICTOR STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES
197 (1987)).
142. Id. at 832-33 (plurality opinion).
143. Id. at 833 (plurality opinion) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
144. Id (plurality opinion) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
145. Id. (plurality opinion).
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and deterrence.146  After stating that while legislative enactments and jury
determinations substantially informed their analysis,1 47 the plurality declared
that "it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits
imposition of the death penalty." 148 The plurality then went on to point out
that a punishment should be directly proportional to the offender's
culpability,' 49 and the fact that juveniles were by definition less culpable than
adults was "too obvious to require extended explanation."' 50 According to the
plurality, due to the reduced culpability of juvenile offenders, the social goal
of retribution as "'an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly
offensive conduct"' simply was not served.' 5' Moreover, the plurality
asserted that the goal of deterrence was inapplicable in this context because
individuals under sixteen accounted for only two percent of all intentional
homicide arrests. 12 As for the two percent of offenders, the plurality
explained that the death penalty would fail to have any deterrent effect; 53 not
only was it highly unlikely that individuals under the age of sixteen would
engage in the sort of cost-benefit analysis that makes the threat of execution a
deterrent, but even if an individual did so, it was equally unlikely that he or
she would be deterred in light of the near nonexistence of the juvenile death
penalty in the twentieth century. 54 The plurality concluded that due to the
"lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for growth,
and society's fiduciary obligations to its children,"' 155 neither the goal of
deterrence nor the goal of retribution was served by executing offenders under
age sixteen. Thus, the imposition of the death penalty on these individuals is
"'nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering,"" 156 and therefore, is unconstitutional. 157
146. Id. at 836 (plurality opinion). "'The death penalty is said to serve two principal social
purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders."' Id. (plurality
opinion) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
147. Id. at 833 (plurality opinion).
148. Id. (plurality opinion).
149. Id. at 834 (plurality opinion).
150. Id. at 835 (plurality opinion).
151. Id. at 836 (plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
152. Id. at 837 (plurality opinion) (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Uniform Crime Reports:
Crime in the United States 174 (1986)).
153. Id. (plurality opinion).
154. Id. at 837-38 (plurality opinion).
155. Id. at 836-37 (plurality opinion).
156. Id. at 838 (plurality opinion) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
157. Id. (plurality opinion).
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2. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
While she accepted the proposition that there exists some age below
which the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional, and also the
precedent that this age must be determined according to the "'evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"",158 Justice
O'Connor was reluctant to conclude, "as a matter of constitutional law,"'
159
that a national consensus set the minimum age of execution at age sixteen in
the absence of more unequivocal evidence. 60 Justice O'Connor recognized
that it seemed very likely that a national consensus did exist, but she
nonetheless acknowledged the remaining nineteen states that had remained
silent on the issue; 16 1 in Justice O'Connor's opinion, these nineteen states
undermined the national consensus that the plurality had found. 162 While
recognizing the qualitative differences between juveniles and adults, Justice
O'Connor pointed out that the characteristics of juveniles that lead legislatures
to treat them differently from adults "vary widely among different individuals
of the same age, and [she] would not substitute [the Court's] inevitably
subjective judgment about the best age at which to draw a line in the capital
punishment context for the judgments of the Nation's legislatures." 163
Justice O'Connor then pointed out that rulings premised on a societal
consensus are inherently dangerous because of the risk of misperception by
the Court. 64 For instance, had the Court found a societal consensus against
the death penalty in 1972 when it was considering Furman v. Georgia, it
would have been mistaken, and more importantly, its "mistaken premise...
would have been frozen into constitutional law, making it difficult to refute
and even more difficult to reject.' 66
Finally, Justice O'Connor pointed out that because Oklahoma statutorily
permitted fifteen-year-old offenders to be treated as adults under some
circumstances, but also failed to explicitly specify a minimum age in its death
penalty statute, there was a danger that Oklahoma had not afforded sufficient
reflection to the possibility that a fifteen-year-old could be executed under its
158. Id. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion)).
159. Id. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 850 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 854 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 855 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
165. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
166. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 855 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
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statutory scheme. 167 Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that the imposition of
the death penalty on an offender under a scheme that failed to specify a
minimum age was unconstitutional. 68  However, Justice O'Connor left
unresolved the broader question of whether the Eighth Amendment forbade
states from executing offenders under the age of sixteen in all circumstances,
choosing instead to leave that question to the state legislatures. 
69
3. The Dissent
Writing for the dissenters,1 70 Justice Scalia began by elucidating the
particularly aggravating facts of Thompson's case and then dove into his
rebuttal of the plurality opinion.' 71 First, Justice Scalia pointed to the trend,
both at the state and federal levels, of lowering the age at which juveniles
could be transferred to adult court and be held criminally liable.' 72 He then
emphasized that it would certainly be odd "to find the consensus regarding
criminal liability of juveniles to be moving in the direction the plurality
perceives for capital punishment, while moving in precisely the opposite
direction for all other penalties."1
73
Justice Scalia went on to criticize the plurality for confining its analysis to
the eighteen states that have expressly set sixteen as the minimum age in their
death penalty statutes, thereby ignoring the federal government and the other
nineteen states, which in fact comprised a majority, at least for those states
that sanctioned capital punishment. 74 Because the federal government and
almost forty percent' 75 of the states sanctioned the very practice that the
plurality claimed there was national consensus against, Justice Scalia pointed
out that the plurality was mistaken in discerning a societal consensus in the
United States anyway, 76 and its reliance on the practices of other nations was
entirely inappropriate. 177 Justice Scalia stated that "it is a Constitution for the
United States of America that we are expounding.'1 78  He relegated to a
167. Id. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 858-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
170. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White joined Justice Scalia's dissent.
171. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 865-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For instance, Congress had recently passed
legislation lowering the age at which a juvenile could be tried and punished as an adult from sixteen
to fifteen. Id. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 866 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 867-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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footnote his discussion of the plurality's reliance on the various state statutes
that prohibit persons under the age of sixteen from voting, marrying without
parental consent, and purchasing cigarettes, among other things.1 79  His
response to the plurality was as follows:
It is surely constitutional for a State to believe that the degree of
maturity that is necessary fully to appreciate the pros and cons of
smoking cigarettes, or even of marrying, may be somewhat greater
than the degree necessary fully° to appreciate the pros and cons of
brutally killing a human being.
Next, the dissent criticized the plurality not only for focusing on execution
as opposed to sentencing statistics,18 1 but also for assuming that a trend that
arguably has existed only since 1948 is sufficient "to justify calling a
constitutional halt to what may well be a pendulum swing in social
attitudes."'' 82  Justice Scalia pointed out that there are a number of reasons
why fifteen-year-olds are rarely sentenced to death, including Lockett v.
Ohio's'83 requirement that death sentences be imposed only on an
individualized basis 184 as well as society's increasing unwillingness to impose
death sentences at all. 185  According to Justice Scalia, the fact that these
juveniles are rarely sentenced to death by no means indicates that they never
should be, and more importantly, does not justify a constitutional ban on all
such executions. 186 Furthermore, he pointed out, there is simply "no rational
basis for discerning [from the fact that our society has decided that executions
of individuals under the age of sixteen should be rare] ... a societal judgment
that no one so much as a day under 16 can ever be mature and morally
responsible enough to deserve that penalty."'
' 87
Finally, Justice Scalia wholeheartedly rejected the plurality's assertion
that "'it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits
179. Id. at 871 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 869 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality finds the fact that no person
under the age of sixteen has been executed since 1948 to be dispositive, instead of focusing on
sentencing trends, such as the fact that in only two years; between 1984 and 1986, five persons under
sixteen were sentenced to death).
182. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
184. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 870 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978)).
185. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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imposition of the death penalty,' ' 188 insofar as the plurality is relying on its
own "perceptions of decency." 189 Justice Scalia pointed out that the Eighth
Amendment only forbids those punishments that are cruel and unusual in the
eyes of American society, not in the eyes of the Court.' 90
C. Stanford v. Kentucky
In Stanford v. Kentucky, 191 a 1989 decision, the Court consolidated two
cases to confront the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment permitted the
execution of an individual who committed a capital crime at the age of sixteen
or seventeen. 192 Kevin Stanford was seventeen years and four months old on
January 7, 1981, when he and an accomplice raped and sodomized Barbel
Poore while they robbed the gas station she worked at.193 After netting 300
cartons of cigarettes, two gallons of gas, and a negligible amount of cash,' 94
they drove Poore to a secluded area where Stanford shot her at point-blank
range in the face and in the back of the head. 195 Due not only to the severity
of the crime, but also to the juvenile system's numerous unsuccessful
rehabilitative attempts to effectively deal with Stanford in the past, the
juvenile court certified him to stand trial as an adult.' 96 After being convicted
of "murder, first-degree sodomy, first-degree robbery, and receiving stolen
property,"'197 a Kentucky jury sentenced Stanford to death.' 98
The second petitioner, Heath Wilkins, was sixteen years and six months
old when he and an accomplice murdered Nancy Allen on July 27, 1985, at
the convenience store that she owned and operated. 199 While his accomplice
restrained Allen, Wilkins repeatedly stabbed her in the chest and left her to
die, but only "[a]fter helping themselves to liquor, cigarettes, rolling papers,
and approximately $450 in cash and checks., 200  Due to the particularly
violent nature of his crime, and also because the juvenile system had
repeatedly failed to effectively treat Wilkins for past delinquency, the juvenile
188. Id. at 873 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting plurality opinion at 833 (citing Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982)).
1 89. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion).
192. Id. (plurality opinion).
193. Id. at 365 (plurality opinion).
194. Id. (plurality opinion).
195. Id. (plurality opinion).
196. Id. (plurality opinion).
197. Id. at 366 (plurality opinion).
198. Id. (plurality opinion).
199. Id. (plurality opinion).
200. Id. (plurality opinion).
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court certified him as an adult.20 1  After pleading guilty to "first-degree
murder, armed criminal action, and carrying a concealed weapon,, 20 2 Wilkins
was sentenced to death.20 3
Writing for the plurality, 204 Justice Scalia found both capital sentences to
be in accordance with "'the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society, ' ' 20 5 and therefore, not forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 20 6  The
plurality began its analysis by pointing out that neither death sentence at issue
would have been considered cruel and unusual at the time of the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, as anyone over the age of seven could theoretically be
executed.20 7  Thus, Stanford and Wilkins could argue only that their
punishments violated contemporary standards of decency. Emphasizing that
the Court's role is to say what these "evolving standards" are, not what the
nine justices think they should be,20 8 Justice Scalia looked first to legislative
enactments as "'objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a
given sanction.'" 20 9 Nineteen of the thirty-seven states that authorized capital
punishment did not specify a minimum age,210 while twelve states precluded
the execution of anyone under the age of eighteen.211 An additional three
states exempted offenders under seventeen. 2  According to Justice Scalia,
these numbers simply did not "establish the degree of national consensus [the]
Court [had] previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment
201. Id. at 367 (plurality opinion).
202. Id. (plurality opinion).
203. Id. (plurality opinion).
204. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she contended that the Court has a
constitutional obligation, imposed by the Eighth Amendment, beyond its duty to examine the
enactments of the nation's legislatures, to engage in a proportionality analysis to ensure that that
there is a sufficient .'nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant's
blameworthiness."' Id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
825 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
205. Id. at 369 (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
206. Id. at 379 (plurality opinion).
207. Id. at 368 (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
208. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378 (plurality opinion).
209. Id. at 370 (plurality opinion) (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
210. Id. at 371 n.3 (plurality opinion).
211. Id. at 370 n.2 (plurality opinion). These states were California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, and
Tennessee. Id. (plurality opinion).
212. Id. (plurality opinion). These states were Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas. Id.
(plurality opinion).
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cruel and unusual. 21 3
Justice Scalia then rejected Wilkins and Stanford's argument that the
reluctance of juries to impose capital sentences on juveniles indicated a
consensus.214 Conceding that relatively few death sentences were imposed on
juveniles, 21 5 Justice Scalia countered by pointing out that relatively few
capital crimes were perpetrated by sixteen and seventeen-year-olds.2 6
Further, Justice Scalia asserted that even if a significant discrepancy did exist
between the number of capital crimes committed by individuals under the age
of eighteen and the number of those offenders sentenced to death, that does
not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the juries find death sentences for
offenders under age eighteen to be "categorically unacceptable. 217 Rather,
Justice Scalia pointed out that "the very considerations which induce
[Stanford and Wilkins] and their supporters to believe that death should never
be imposed on offenders under 18 cause prosecutors and juries to believe that
it should rarely be imposed.,
218
Justice Scalia, as he did in his Thompson dissent, again emphasized the
irrelevance of statutory schemes which specify the legally permissible age for
engaging in certain activities, such as voting and marrying, at eighteen.219 He
pointed out that the maturity level required to "drive carefully, to drink
responsibly, or to vote intelligently ' 220 is far greater that than the level of
maturity needed to both understand that murder is wrong and also to "conform
one's conduct to that most minimal of all civilized standards. 22'
Furthermore, eighteen merely represents a legislative estimate of the age at
which most individuals are capable of engaging in certain activities; there is
no system to make an individualized determination as to each potential
driver's, drinker's, or voter's maturity level.222 By contrast, "'individualized
consideration [is] a constitutional requirement' ' '223 in every capital sentencing
proceeding, and in each case, a sentencer must be permitted to consider the
213. Id. at 371 (plurality opinion). By way of contrast, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977), the Court overturned the death sentence of a convicted rapist in large part because Georgia
was the only state that pcrmitted capital punishment in rape cases. Id. at 592-96.
214. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373-77 (plurality opinion).
215. Id. at 373 (plurality opinion).
216. Id. at 374 (plurality opinion).
217. Id. (plurality opinion).
218. Id. (plurality opinion).
219. Id. (plurality opinion).
220. Id. (plurality opinion).
221. Id. (plurality opinion).
222. Id. (plurality opinion).
223. Id. at 375 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978))
(alteration in original).
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defendant's age as a mitigating factor. 224 Justice Scalia asserted that such an
individualized system fails to pass constitutional muster only if a
demonstrable societal consensus that no sixteen or seventeen-year-old is
mature enough to be held fully responsible for murder exists. Such a
consensus is derived not from voting or drinking statutes, but from "the ages
at which the States permit their particularized capital punishment systems to
be applied.,
225
Finally, Justice Scalia addressed the contention that capital sentences
imposed on sixteen and seventeen-year-olds fail to further the penological
goals of the criminal justice system, namely deterrence and retribution.
Stanford and Wilkins pointed to evidence, which suggested that due to their
not yet fully developed cognitive skills, juveniles are undeterred by the threat
of capital punishment because they generally are less fearful of death than
adults are. Furthermore, because juveniles are not as mature and responsible,
and therefore not as culpable as adults, the execution of sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds fails to vindicate and justify society's legitimate
retributive impulse. 226 Justice Scalia dismissed the argument, stating that the
evidence presented by the petitioners simply did not demonstrate that "no 16-
year-old is 'adequately responsible' or significantly deterred., 227 He rejected
the invitation to substitute the Court's "informed judgment"228 for that of
society's, as the role of the Court is not to decide what the "evolving
standards of decency" 229 ought to be, but rather to identify what they in fact
are. Because the actions of sentencing juries and the enactments of the
nation's legislatures evidenced no discernable societal consensus against the
execution of sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders, the plurality concluded
that such punishments are consistent with the demands of the Eighth
Amendment.
230
IV. DOES A TKINS REQUIRE THAT STANFORD BE REVISITED AND PERHAPS
OVERTURNED?
A. The Similarities Between Thompson and Atkins
The Atkins majority employed reasoning very similar to that of the
224. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)).
225. Id. at 376-77 (plurality opinion).
226. Id. at 377-78 (plurality opinion).
227. Id. at 378 (plurality opinion).
228. Id. (plurality opinion)
229. Id. (plurality opinion)
230. Id. at 380 (plurality opinion).
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Thompson plurality, and hence, the Court could potentially rely on this line of
reasoning to revisit its decision in Stanford and find the imposition of the
death penalty on anyone under the age of eighteen to be cruel and unusual.
Certainly there has not been the sort of "consistency of the direction of
change' '231 in state statutory schemes that led the Atkins court, at least in part,
to find a national consensus opposing the execution of mentally retarded
individuals. However, as the dissenting justices recently pointed out in In re
Stanford,232 twenty-eight states 233 currently refuse to execute juvenile
offenders, only two less than the number that refused to execute mentally
retarded offenders.234 Furthermore, since 1989, the year that Stanford was
initially decided, Indiana, Montana, New York, and Kansas have all passed
legislation prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders.235 Certainly there
is an argument to be made that although the juvenile death penalty is not
currently prohibited in twenty-two states, and the practice was considered
acceptable at the time that the Bill of Rights was ratified, there may be a
growing national consensus against it.
As discussed by both the majority in Atkins and the plurality in Thompson,
not only at the national, but also at the international level, the execution of
juveniles is widely disapproved of, much like the execution of mentally
retarded persons. Since 1990, only seven countries in the world, Iran,
Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and the United States have been known to execute juveniles. 623  The United
Nations Convention exempts individuals under the age of eighteen from the
death penalty, and the United States is the only country in the world that has
231. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
232. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002).
233. Id. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The In re Stanford dissenters include within this
number the twelve states that do not impose the death penalty under any circumstances. These states
are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. For a listing of the death penalty jurisdictions that
expressly set eighteen as the minimum age, see Streib, supra note 22, at 7 (reporting that California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, and both the federal government and the
military statutorily specify eighteen as the minimum age at which death may be imposed).
234. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 968.
235. Id. at 968-69; see id at 969 nn.l-5
(citing IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3, § 3(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2002); 2002 Ind. Pub. L. 117-2002 §
1; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(2) (1997); 1999 Mont. Laws; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (West
Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4622 (1995); State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1103 (Wash.
1993) (holding that juveniles may not be sentenced to death for any crime)).
236. Juvenile and the Death Penalty, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited on Feb.
23, 2003).
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refused to ratify this international agreement.237 As pointed out by Richard
Dieter, the executive director of the Death Penalty Information Center, the
United States may be isolating itself from its allies by continuing to impose
death sentences on juveniles in spite of an international climate largely
opposed to the practice.238
Moreover, both the Atkins majority239 and the Thompson plurality240 found
that the social purposes of the death penalty are not adequately vindicated
when mentally retarded individuals and juveniles below the age of sixteen are
executed. Like mentally retarded individuals, juveniles, at least those under
the age of sixteen, are simply not as morally culpable for their crimes as are
offenders over the age of sixteen, and therefore, society does not have the
same retributive impetus to execute them.241 Just as a mentally retarded
person's crimes can be attributed, at least in part, to a deficient level of
cognitive reasoning, so too can a juvenile's crimes be partially blamed on the
failure of society and parents to adequately nurture and rehabilitate the
child.242 One may argue that neither mentally retarded persons nor juveniles
are completely responsible for their crimes, and thus, because society's
"interest in seeing that the offender gets his 'just deserts"' ' 243 is directly related
to the individual culpability of the offender,244 the retributive rationale for the
death penalty fails.
Furthermore, as contended by both the Atkins majority and the Thompson
plurality, because both mentally retarded individuals and juveniles are less
deterred by the threat of death than are adults of normal intelligence, the
imposition of the death penalty on these individuals fails to promote the social
goal of deterrence.245 The deterrence rationale is "predicated upon the notion
that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from
237. Streib, supra note 22, at 8.
238. Dieter, supra note 21.
239. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-21 (2002); see also supra notes 59-62 and
accompanying text.
240. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833-38; see also supra notes 144-57 and
accompanying text.
241. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836-37. The plurality concluded that the "proposition that less
culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed
by an adult ... is too obvious to require extended explanation." Id. at 835.
242. See generally Mirah A. Horowitz, Kids Who Kill: A Critique of How the American Legal
System Deals With Juveniles Who Commit Homicide, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS at 133, 154-58
(Summer 2000).
243. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
244. Id.
245. See supra notes 59-62 and 144-57 and accompanying text.
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carrying out murderous conduct,, 246 and thus, to be effectively deterred, a
murderer must weigh the benefits of carrying out the desired murder against
the potential cost of execution.247 For the very same reasons that make them
less culpable-namely their reduced cognitive capability, as well as their
inability to learn from experience, to reason logically, and to control their
impulses248 -mentally retarded persons are less likely to engage in the sort of
calculus that the theory of deterrence presumes, and therefore, they are less
deterred by the prospect of death.249 Similarly, the prospect of execution
deters juveniles less than adults not only because the notion of death is so
foreign and distant to them,250 but also because of the reduced likelihood that
they will consider the long-term consequences of their actions and "attach []
any weight to the possibility of execution., 251
B. What is Wrong With Using Atkins and Thompson to Abolish the Juvenile
Death Penalty?
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, both the Atkins majority and
the Thompson plurality espoused a seemingly persuasive rationale on which to
build an argument that the imposition of the death penalty on individuals
under the age of eighteen is cruel and unusual as measured by "'the evolving
standards' 252 test dictated by the Eighth Amendment. The discussion is not
intended to suggest that a perfectly symmetrical analogy may be drawn
between mentally retarded persons and adolescents, for there are clearly
qualitative differences between the two groups. However, the Atkins majority
drew heavily upon the Thompson plurality's analysis, thereby indicating that
at least six members of the Supreme Court find the rationale for exempting
offenders under the age of sixteen from the death penalty to be applicable
with regard to mentally retarded persons, and further suggesting that the Court
may use this very same rationale to exclude juveniles from capital punishment
altogether.
Premising further constitutional precedent on the shaky ground upon
which Atkins and Thompson were decided is dangerous. The Court largely
246. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Brody, supra note 15, at 33 (noting that Victor Streib, a well-known expert and vocal
opponent of juvenile executions, has suggested that death is "often a vague and distant notion to
adolescents").
251. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 404 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
252. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
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justified both decisions on what it perceived to be a marked shift in the
"'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,' ' '253 as evidenced by a national consensus that it somehow discerned.
In both cases, the Court was able to find a consensus only by including the
states that prohibit capital punishment altogether within its calculation to
arrive at a "majority" of states that oppose the execution of mentally retarded
individuals and juveniles under the age of sixteen.254 Likewise, the dissenters
in In re Stanford255 point out that twenty-eight states refuse to execute
juveniles while failing to acknowledge the fact that twelve of these states do
not authorize capital punishment under any circumstances. 256 The problem is
that neither the execution of mentally retarded individuals nor the execution
of juveniles is an issue for any of these twelve states, for they have
determined that the imposition of the death penalty on anyone is wrong.257
Because the issue is "not whether capital punishment is thought to be
desirable, but whether persons under 18 are thought to be specifically
exempt,, 258 the views of the twelve states that prohibit capital punishment
altogether have no bearing.2 59 As pointed out by Justice Scalia in his Atkins
dissent, the fact that forty-seven percent of death penalty jurisdictions have
recently passed legislation outlawing the execution of the mentally retarded
hardly constitutes a national consensus, especially because the legislation was
only prospectively effective for eleven of those states.260  Likewise, if the
Court were to discern a national consensus from the fact that sixteen of the
thirty-eight states (forty-two percent) that authorize the death penalty refuse to
impose it on juveniles,261 it would be mistaken, as it was in Atkins, for it
would be using the wrong denominator. Finally, just as the majority in Atkins
found the "consistency of the direction of change" 262 in state statutory
schemes to be indicative of a consensus against the execution of the mentally
retarded, one could argue, as did the dissenters in In re Stanford,263 that the
253. Id.
254. Id. at 826-27; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. 537 U.S. 968 (2002).
256. Id. at 968 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
257. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.2 (1989).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. See Streib, supra note 22, at 7. Professor Streib notes that the federal government and the
military also set the minimum age for execution at age eighteen. Id. Even when these are included
within the calculation, however, only forty-five percent of death penalty jurisdictions expressly
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles. Id.
262. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
263. 537 U.S. 968 (2002).
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five states that have recently set eighteen as the minimum age at which the
death penalty may be imposed 264 are evidence of a consensus against the
juvenile death penalty. If a simple majority opposing the execution of
juveniles cannot be discerned, however, it is unclear how the recent
legislation of five states is relevant, particularly because '"[i]t is 'myopic to
base sweeping constitutional principles upon the narrow experience of [a few]
years.'"265
Moreover, the Court's reliance on an international consensus against the
death penalty for mentally retarded individuals and juveniles was
inappropriate in both Atkins and in Thompson. First of all, if in fact a national
consensus exists, it is unnecessary to examine the views of the international
community.266 If on the other hand, there is no discernible national
consensus, the views of other nations, however strongly held, cannot replace
those of the American people.267 Any reliance on the perspectives of
professional and religious organizations is equally misplaced, for it certainly
is not clear whether their views are at all representative of the American
people.268 Furthermore, opinion polls are even more uncertain ground upon
which to base constitutional law, especially in light of all of the evidence
demonstrating the potentially high margin of error.
269
Although legislative enactments are the "'most reliable objective evidence
of contemporary values,' 270 the actions of sentencing juries are also highly
relevant. 271  Beyond noting that "among those States that regularly execute
offenders and that have no prohibition with regard to the mentally retarded,
only five have executed offenders possessing a known IQ less than 70 since
[1989], ' '272 the Atkins court failed to address how the behavior of juries helped
lead to the conclusion that the execution of mentally retarded individuals
264. Id. at 968-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra note 235 and accompanying text.
265. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
614 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
266. See id. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
267. See id at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. See id.
269. See id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 322-23 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S 302, 331 (1989)).
271. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 n.7 (1988) (stating that "capital
punishment jurisprudence has consistently recognized that contemporary standards, as reflected
by... juries, provide an important measure of whether the death penalty is 'cruel and unusual').
272. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. As pointed out at note 80 supra, there is much evidence to
suggest that in fact a significant number of death row inmates are mentally retarded. See, e.g.,
Human Rights Watch, Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and Offenders With Mental Retardation,
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat (2001) (suggesting that up to three hundred inmates
currently on death row may be mentally retarded and noting that since 1976, at least thirty-five
mentally retarded offenders have been executed.)
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violated contemporary standards of decency. The Thompson court relied
upon the fact that the last juvenile execution took place in 1948 to
demonstrate the reluctance of juries to impose death on juveniles.273 Since
Thompson was decided, however, at least twenty-one juveniles have been
executed,274 and thus, the practice, while certainly not commonplace, is also
not extinct. Furthermore, the relative infrequency with which death sentences
are imposed on juveniles can be attributed to several different factors having
nothing to do with a moral determination by the nation's juries that the
execution of juveniles is categorically wrong. One explanation275 for this is
the "individualized sentencing" requirement of Lockett v. Ohio.a7 6 Lockett
mandated that every capital defendant be given individualized consideration
and be permitted to introduce, and have considered, any mitigating
evidence.277 Because juries now are required to consider and give weight to
mitigating evidence of age or mental retardation, the result is that fewer
individuals in these groups are sentenced to death.278  This sort of
individualized consideration is sufficient to ensure that only the most
deserving defendants, even those between the age of sixteen and eighteen and
those with low IQs, are executed. Furthermore, as pointed out by Justice
Scalia, it is very likely that the very same reasons which lead death penalty
opponents to conclude that juvenile death sentences should never be imposed
also lead juries to rarely impose death upon juvenile offenders.279
Finally, the argument, relied on by both the Atkins and the Thompson
courts, that neither the execution of mentally retarded individuals nor the
execution of juveniles measurably contributes to the social goals of retribution
and deterrence is simply not supported by objective evidence, 280 and thus, it
may not be employed to justify a categorical exclusion of anyone under the
age of eighteen from the death penalty. With respect to the social goal of
273. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832.
274. See Streib, supra note 22, at 5.
275. See Kato, supra note 99, at 133-34.
276. 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
277. Id.
278. See Kato, supra note 99, at 133-34.
279. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989).
280. See Kato, supra note 99, at 136-37 (noting that the Thompson plurality failed to conduct
an objective inquiry into whether retribution and deterrence were in fact well-served by the juvenile
death penalty and asserting that the plurality instead relied on its own subjective beliefs to conclude
that executing juveniles failed to contribute to either retribution or deterrence). But see Lawrence A.
Vanore, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors: Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of
Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 787-90 (1986) (asserting that juveniles are less blameworthy, and thus
less deserving of punishment, than their adult counterparts and also that because the possibility of
death is so remote and because juveniles are unlikely to adjust their behavior based solely on the
threat of execution, the death penalty fails to deter juveniles).
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retribution, the argument fails because although it may be true that juveniles
are oftentimes less responsible, and therefore less culpable for their crimes, 281
it cannot be said with certainty that there is not a single sixteen or seventeen-
year-old that fully contemplates the inherent evil in murder of another human
being.282 Moreover, both the Atkins and the Thompson courts erred by
concentrating only on the personal responsibility of the offender.283 The
principle of retribution revolves around the notion that murderers deserve
their punishment not only due to their moral blameworthiness, but also due to
the particular heinousness of their crimes.284 Thus, as long as sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds who have committed capital crimes fully understand the
wrongfulness of murder,285 they should not be exempted from the death
penalty simply because they have not yet reached their eighteenth birthdays
when they make the very grave and irreversible decision to take another's life.
Just as there is no evidence to prove with any degree of certainty that
juveniles are never capable of fully understanding, and thus, being held fully
responsible for murder, there is also no reason to believe that juveniles will
never be deterred by the threat of the death penalty. In Atkins and Thompson,
the Court posited that neither mentally retarded persons nor juveniles below
the age of sixteen would be adequately deterred by the existence of the death
penalty so as to make its imposition justifiable.2 86 In both cases, the Court
essentially contends that in order for the death penalty to deter, the offender
281. See Greenwald, supra note 17, at 1492-98 (listing a number of reasons why juveniles are
less responsible, and therefore, less culpable than adults for their crimes); see also Horowitz, supra
note 242, at 163-66 (asserting that minors are fundamentally different and also less responsible than
adults for their crimes).
282. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 870 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[t]here is no rational basis for [concluding]... that no one so much as a day under 16 can ever be
mature and morally responsible enough to deserve [the death] penalty").
283. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) ("With respect to retribution-the interest in
seeing that the offender gets his 'just deserts'-the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily
depends on the culpability of the offender."); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 ("It is generally agreed
'that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant."'
(quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring))). While both of
these propositions are true, both the Atkins and the Thompson courts fail to consider the depravity of
the offender's crime as part of the focus of the social goal of retribution.
284. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "[s]urely culpability, and
deservedness of the most severe retribution, depends not merely (if at all) upon the mental capacity
of the criminal (above the level where he is able to distinguish right from wrong) but also upon the
depravity of the crime...").
285. Whether or not a juvenile fully contemplates, and thus can be held responsible for, the
inherent evil of murder will be sufficiently determined by the sort of individualized consideration
mandated by Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and therefore, it is unnecessary to categorically
preclude the execution of every sixteen and seventeen-year-old offender.
286. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837-38.
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must engage in cost-benefit analysis, weighing the benefits of the envisioned
murder against the costs of potential execution.287 There is a high degree of
premeditation involved in such a calculation, and because mentally retarded
individuals lack the level of cognitive ability,288 and juveniles lack the
forethought and appreciation of long-term consequences 289 necessary to
engage in this sort of analysis, they will not be deterred by the possibility of
execution; therefore, imposing death sentences on them constitutes nothing
more than "'purposeless and needless ... pain and suffering.' ' 290 Or so the
argument goes. There simply is not enough evidence to demonstrate that no
sixteen or seventeen-year-old who is contemplating carrying out a murder will
consider the possibility of execution and be deterred by it. It defies reason to
conclude that someone who is seventeen years and eleven months old is
absolutely incapable of engaging in the sort of cost-benefit analysis
anticipated by the deterrence rationale, but upon his eighteenth birthday, he
miraculously engenders this ability.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, both in Atkins and in Thompson, the
Court mistakenly concluded that the imposition of the death penalty on all
mentally retarded individuals and juveniles below the age of sixteen must be
categorically proscribed. Using this same line of reasoning to overturn
Stanford v. Kentucky29' and to thereby justify an absolute ban on the execution
of all juvenile offenders would only serve to perpetuate an already convoluted
line of precedent.
V. INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING AS A SOLUTION TO THE ERROR OF LINE-
DRAWING
A. Delineating an Age Below Which Capital Punishment May Not Be Imposed
Is a Mistake2 92
Both in Atkins and in Thompson, the Court found that the fact that the
287. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837-38.
288. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 272 (noting the
significant cognitive limitations of mentally retarded individuals, and asserting that due to these
deficiencies, mentally retarded individuals should not be eligible for the death penalty).
289. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837-38; see also Greenwald, supra note 17, at 1510-13 (suggesting
that juveniles lack both the "intellectual capacity to understand the threat of punishment [as well as
the] control mechanisms to conform to that understanding" in part due to their tendency to disregard
the consequences of their actions).
290. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
291. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
292. See generally Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the
Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229 (1989) (discussing the reasons why drawing a bright-line rule
with respect to the age at which death may be imposed is unjust and unnecessary).
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death penalty is rarely imposed on mentally retarded individuals and juveniles
is evidence that juries find capital punishment to be cruel and unusual with
respect to these individuals. Using this rationale, one could argue that
because women and elderly persons are infrequently executed, they too
should be exempted from the death penalty.293 One could even argue that
because death sentences are rarely imposed on American citizens, the death
penalty is always cruel and unusual punishment. 294 But this surely cannot be
the case because our society has determined that the death penalty is
appropriate in certain limited circumstances. 95
The sort of bright-line drawing that both the Atkins and the Thompson
court engaged in is inherently unfair, and if the Court revisits and overturns
Stanford, as at least four justices have urged,296 this very same line-drawing
would only serve to produce unjust results. One may envision a scenario in
which two individuals, one aged eighteen and one month and the other aged
seventeen and nine months, commit a grisly murder.297 If Stanford were to be
overturned, the eighteen-year-old would be eligible for the death penalty in a
state which allows for capital punishment, while the seventeen-year-old, who
may have more responsibility for the murder, and thus more deserving of
punishment, would be exempt from death.298 It certainly seems unfair that an
individual who commits a heinous crime may escape death merely because he
has yet to reach his eighteenth birthday, while another individual possessing
equal, or even less culpability, may receive a death sentence.
B. Individualized Sentencing as an Answer to this Apparent Injustice
Although there is no doubt that mentally retarded individuals and
juveniles frequently lack the degree of culpability necessary to warrant a
death sentence, it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that these
individuals are never deserving of the death penalty. As long as our society
deems capital punishment to be appropriate and constitutionally permissible
under certain circumstances, it is unjust for the Court to continue to carve out
exemptions for various groups of people. The better approach, and the
293. See Kato, supra note 99, at 134 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 871 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
294. Id.
295. See id.
296. See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 972 (2002) (wherein Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer assert that the juvenile death penalty is "a shameful practice" and should be declared
unconstitutional).
297. See Hoffman, supra note 292, at 244-47 (discussing actual cases, similar to the
hypothetical, in which a bright-line age distinction would have worked unjust results).
298. See id.
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approach mandated by the Court's own precedent, 299 is individualized
consideration at sentencing.
All capital defendants have a constitutional right to have their cases
considered on an individual basis by the jury, 300 and therefore, it is
unnecessary for the Supreme Court to step in and categorically prohibit the
execution of a mentally retarded individual or a juvenile if a jury, upon careful
consideration of the particular facts of the offender's case, decides that a death
sentence is warranted. Before a juvenile may stand trial as an adult, most
states require that the juvenile court certify him after reviewing his past
criminal record, his '"criminal sophistication, ,,30 and whether there is any
possibility of rehabilitation among other things.30 2 Furthermore, if the
juvenile is certified to stand trial as an adult, at sentencing he has a
constitutional right to introduce, and the jury has a constitutional duty to
consider,30 3 his age as well as his "background and mental and emotional
development" 30 4 and any other factors as mitigating evidence. Thus, it is
simply not necessary, and it is even unfair, for the Court to delineate an age at
which the death penalty may never be imposed because the individualized
consideration mandated by the Court's own precedent is sufficient to ensure
that only the most deserving juveniles are put to death.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment is intended to be neither an endorsement nor an indictment
of capital punishment. It is intended, however, to be an assertion that if we as
a society have determined that capital punishment is an appropriate remedy
for murder in some circumstances, it is imperative that we impose this most
harsh and irrevocable of penalties in a fair and impartial manner. There is no
justifiable basis on which the Supreme Court may categorically preclude from
death individuals whom it believes to be undeserving when state legislatures
and sentencing juries, all of whom are in a far better position to assess the
propriety of a capital sentence in a given case, have deemed the death penalty
to be warranted. Wholesale exemption of juveniles from the death penalty is
both unnecessary and potentially grossly unfair, at least from the perspective
of an offender over the age of eighteen. Rather than providing juveniles with
299. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that individualized consideration in
death penalty cases is a constitutional requirement).
300. Id.
301. Kato, supra note 99, at 141 (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1997)).
302. Id.; see also Greenwald, supra note 17 at 1476-82 (discussing the procedure whereby a
juvenile is transferred from juvenile to adult court).
303. See Kato, supra note 99, at 142.
304. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).
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absolute immunity, as the Court has done for mentally retarded offenders,
each juvenile offender should be accorded individualized consideration, and
age should be a mitigating, but not necessarily an exculpatory, factor.
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